aol.pm

Temporary Elevated Cloud Access

Subtechnique · ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005

Attributed source ↗ · Plaintext record · Complete record and assertions JSON

Inspect structured metadata and provenance
{
  "id": "ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005",
  "title": "Temporary Elevated Cloud Access",
  "type": "Subtechnique",
  "source_url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005",
  "snapshot": "enterprise-attack-20.0.json",
  "status": "active",
  "rights": "Source metadata only; source notices retained; no operational prose or payloads",
  "review_status": "machine-extracted; source-specific checks passed, editorial review pending",
  "stix_id": "attack-pattern--6fa224c7-5091-4595-bf15-3fc9fe2f2c7c",
  "external_id": "T1548.005",
  "domain": "enterprise",
  "created": "2023-07-10T16:37:15.672Z",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T15:12:00.641Z",
  "version": "2.0",
  "aliases": [

  ],
  "tactics": [
    "privilege-escalation"
  ],
  "source_references": [
    {
      "source_name": "AWS PassRole",
      "url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022",
      "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023",
      "url": "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles",
      "url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange",
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Azure Just in Time Access 2023",
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
      "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation",
      "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023",
      "url": "https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023",
      "url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/"
    }
  ]
}

Explicit source assertions (2)

First 80 shown here; the complete set is in this record’s JSON and plaintext. Each relationship retains its source and locator. No inferred relationships are added.

ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005 → subtechnique-of → ATTACK:enterprise:T1548

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--3dd34032-bef9-4dec-bed4-77b670c70453

ATTACK:enterprise:M1018 → mitigates → ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--b811da67-8da1-4f2e-aae0-8666093cf95d

Provided as is, for information only, with no warranty and no liability. Not legal or professional advice. Security and radio material is for authorized, lawful use only. Full disclaimer.

Visits are logged on our own server: IP address, browser and device details, and pages viewed. We use them to understand traffic and spot attacks, and never share or sell them.